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ment of shallow semantical embeddings (SSEs) of non-classical logics in clas-
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1 Introduction
Research presented at the 2nd and 3rd International Conferences on Logic and
Argumentation (CLAR) applied higher-order automated and interactive the-
orem proving to the deep logical analysis of rational arguments and argument
networks (Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2019b, 2020).
In the former paper we argued for an interpretive approach towards the
deep, pluralistic logical analysis of argumentative discourse, termed computa-
tional hermeneutics, amenable to partial mechanization using three kinds of
automated reasoning technology: (i) theorem provers, which tell us whether a
formalized claim logically follows from a set of assumptions; (ii) model finders,
which give us (counter-)examples for formulas in the context of a background
set of assumptions; and (iii) so-called “hammers”, which automatically invoke
(i) as to find minimal sets of relevant premises sufficient to derive a claim,
whose consistency can later be verified by (ii). We exemplified this approach
by employing implementations of (i-iii) for classical higher-order logic (HOL,
Benzmu¨ller and Andrews 2019) within the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant (Nip-
kow et al. 2002) to analyze several variants of Kurt Go¨del’s ontological argu-
ment.1 Initially, the variants were reconstructed as networks of abstract nodes,
which were mechanically tested for validity and consistency after adding or re-
moving dialectical relations of attack and support. Later, each abstract node
became ‘instantiated’ by identifying it with a formula of a target logic, a higher-
order modal logic in this case, and the experiments were repeated. Employing
tools (i-iii), we showed that, e.g., consistency results for the abstracted argu-
ments are not preserved at the instantiated level, i.e., after the internal logical
structure of the argument nodes is provided. Drawing on this and other similar
results, we argued that the analysis of non-trivial natural-language arguments
at the abstract argumentation level is useful, but of limited explanatory power.
Achieving proper explanatory power requires the extension of techniques from
abstract argumentation with means for deep and logico-pluralistic semantical
analysis using expressive logic formalisms, e.g., approaches inspired by Mon-
tague semantics (Janssen 2020) employing higher-order and modal logics, and,
vice versa, deep logical methods for semantical analysis can become enriched
at more abstract level by integrating them with contemporary argumentation
frameworks (Baroni et al. 2018).
In the second paper we further expanded these initial ideas and exper-
iments towards the design of a systematic framework, thereby still largely
omitting a proper theoretical exhibition, as contributed in the present article.
In that paper we then focused from the beginning on instantiated argument
networks and on the use of automated tools to support the process of re-
constructing both individual argumentations and attack/support relations as
deductive arguments. To that account we introduced another case study, this
1 Ontological arguments (or proofs) are arguments for the existence of a Godlike being,
common since centuries in philosophy and theology. More recently, they have attracted the
attention of philosophers and logicians, not only because of their interesting history, but
also because of their quite sophisticated logical structures.
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time formalizing and evaluating an excerpt from a quite contemporary and
controversial discourse topic, ethical aspects of climate engineering (Betz and
Cacean 2012), in order to illustrate the generality of our ambitions in contrast
to the previously studied, more philosophically-oriented arguments. Unsurpris-
ingly, as in most debates, arguments can generally be seen as enthymemes in
need for missing, implicit premises; apparently this seems even more so the
case for ‘real-life’ debates than for philosophical arguments. We illustrated how
the utilization of automated reasoning technology for expressive higher-order
logics has realistic prospects in the analysis of argumentative discourse ‘in the
wild’. In particular, our results suggested that this technology can be very
useful to help in the reconstruction of argument networks using structured,
deductive approaches,2 such as ABA (Dung et al. 2009) and deductive argu-
mentation (Besnard and Hunter 2014), and also to help identify implicit and
idle premises in arguments, as addressed in our previous work.
The case studies conducted in both papers were formalized and encoded,
using combinations of quantified modal logics, in the Isabelle/HOL proof as-
sistant, which features a classical higher-order logic (HOL) as its logical foun-
dation. HOL is a conservative extension of Church’s simple type theory (STT),
a logic of functions formulated on top of the simply typed lambda-calculus,
which also provides a foundation for functional programming. In order to turn
Isabelle/HOL into a flexible modal logic reasoner, we have adopted the shallow
semantical embeddings (SSE) approach (Benzmu¨ller 2019), which harnesses
the expressive power of higher-order logic as a meta-language allowing the
faithful encoding of Kripke-like semantics for quantified modal logics (among
other non-classical logics) in STT/HOL, thereby turning higher-order theorem
proving systems into universal reasoning engines.
Putting a focus on the ‘real-life’ case study from the second paper, this ar-
ticle merges the ideas and developments from our prior conference papers and
presents them in a coherent, self-contained manner. In addition, we further
extend our prior work by adding a self-contained exposition of the main the-
oretical underpinnings of the SSE approach using the conceptual framework
of formal signatures, languages and their morphisms – a perspective inspired
by, and linking to, algebraic methods in logic (Abramsky et al. 2000; Carnielli
et al. 2008) –, while at the same time striving for a most natural, self-contained
exposition, e.g. not relying on the reader’s previous knowledge of categorial or
algebraic notions. The original case study on the ethical aspects of climate en-
2 Our reason for choosing a deductive approach originally had a technical motivation:
the base logic provided (off-the-shelf) in Isabelle/HOL is classical (structural, monotonic,
etc.), and, as we will see, SSEs in the default setting reuse the classical consequence relation
of the meta-logic HOL. However, SSEs of non-monotonic logics are also possible, e.g., by
explicitly modeling a non-monotonic conditional operator (Benzmu¨ller 2017) and by defining
a corresponding (non-monotonic) consequence relation which satisfies the deduction meta-
theorem. For the time being we won’t be pursuing such an approach, aiming at simplicity
of exposition, and since this often takes a toll on the performance of automated tools. In
this respect we have chosen to treat arguments as deductions, thus locating all fallibility of
an argument in its (often implicit) premises.
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gineering has been slightly adapted for the sake of illustrating the theoretical
notions as newly introduced.
Paper structure: In Section 2 we argue for the usefulness of a higher-order
logic as a sort of lingua franca allowing us to ‘glue together’ arguments encoded
in different logics. In the next two sections we prepare the ground for the
definition of a shallow semantical embedding (SSE) of a target logic into a
host (meta-)logic. In Section 3 we introduce some basic conceptual machinery
(illustrated with numerous examples) allowing us to characterize both host and
target languages in terms of their signatures, while abstracting away from their
grammars. Section 4 offers a semantic justification for this move by introducing
the notion of a derived signature, which enables us to characterize SSEs as:
(i) specifically constrained fragments of a higher-order host language, and (ii)
(conservative) translations from the target language into this fragment of the
host language. This section then illustrates with a wide array of examples how
to employ the SSE technique to characterize different kinds of target logics
this way. Section 5 introduces some useful notions from formal argumentation
to be employed later in our case study and shows how to encode them in the
higher-order logic of Isabelle/HOL by using this technique. Section 6 presents
our illustrative ‘real-life’ case study on the subject of climate engineering.3
Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses ongoing and future work.
2 Classical Higher-Order Logic as a Lingua Franca
The need for combining heterogeneous, expressive logical formalisms for the
analysis of argumentative discourse is manifest in view of the richness of nat-
ural language phenomena. As we see it, the problem is less the lack of logical
systems to represent those diverse perspectives, but rather the issue of bring-
ing them coherently under the same roof. In other words, the actual lack is
a lingua franca by means of which we can (i) flexibly combine logics, as re-
quired for the appropriate formalization of non-trivial normative arguments,
and (ii) enable the articulation of inter-logical dialectical relations; e.g., how
can arguments formalized using different logics actually attack or support each
other?.
The proposed solution relies on the adoption of classical higher-order logic
(HOL) as a metalanguage into which the logical connectives of (a combination
of) target logics can be ‘translated’ or ‘embedded’. This approach, termed shal-
low semantical embeddings (SSE) (Benzmu¨ller 2019; Benzmu¨ller and Paulson
2013), has quite interesting practical applications, and it supports the reuse
of existing reasoning infrastructure for first-order (FO) logic and higher-order
(HO) logic for seamlessly combining and reasoning with different quantified
classical and non-classical logics—including modal, deontic, and paraconsistent
3 Sources for this case study have been made available online (https://github.com/
davfuenmayor/CE-Debate). We encourage the interested reader to try out (and improve on)
this work.
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Fig. 1 Analyzing a joint attack relation.
logics as illustrated below—many of which are well suited for normative reason-
ing applications.4 Moreover, it supports a logico-pluralistic approach towards
the formalization of arguments, indeed blurring the line between logical and
extralogical, respectively syncategorematic and categorematic, expressions.
An illustrative situation is depicted in Fig. 1, where two arguments, formal-
ized in, say, logics L1 and L2, jointly attack a third argument, formalized in
logic L3. The joint attack relation is itself modeled and encoded as an argument
employing the logic combination L1+L2+L3. This approach to the computer-
supported logical analysis of argumentative discourse is further explained in
Section 6 using the already mentioned ‘real-life’ debate on the ethical aspects
of climate engineering. Further notice that, since our approach presupposes
the logical validity and non-circularity of the formalized arguments, unless we
have solid evidence of the contrary,5 there will be, in most non-trivial cases, a
need for additional, tacit premises; cf. PT in Fig. 1. These additional premises
can be of a different nature. Some may be part of underlying logical theories
and thus correspond to axioms (such as K, D, T , 4, etc.) or definitions from
4 The SSE technique, which has become the pillar stone of the LogiKEy (Benzmu¨ller et
al. 2020) framework and methodology for designing normative theories in ethical and legal
reasoning, has already demonstrated its relevance for research, education and application;
cf. the examples at logikey.org. It has e.g. been exploited successfully in prior work on
the logical analysis of argumentative discourse (Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2018, 2019a,c,
2020) and also in computational metaphysics (Kirchner et al. 2019).
5 In particular, following the interpretive “principle of charity” (Davidson 2001), we aim
at formalizations which render the argument as logically valid, while having a consistent
and minimal set of assumptions. These actions are to be repeated until arriving at a state
of reflective equilibrium: a state where our arguments and claims have the highest degree of
coherence and acceptability according to syntactic and, particularly, inferential criteria of
adequacy; cf. Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller (2019a,b).
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the SSE for the target logic (cf. Benzmu¨ller et al. 2020, §7.1), while others
may correspond to formalized principles from e.g. domain theories or general
world knowledge (cf. Benzmu¨ller et al. 2020, §7.2). They may also correspond
to unstated, ‘implicit’ assumptions specific for the argument at hand.
In the next section we will explore some notions allowing us to articulate
theoretically our notion of SSE. We start by illustrating propositional signa-
tures, before generalizing towards the corresponding higher-order notions.
3 Preliminaries: Signatures, Grammars and Languages
It is customary to define propositional languages over a given set of proposi-
tional symbols (sometimes called a “signature”), while the logical connectives
are introduced by the language-generating mechanism or grammar. As an il-
lustration, a typical textbook approach for defining a modal language starts by
introducing a “signature” set P = {pn}0≤n<m consisting of m propositional
atoms. Subsequently, the modal language becomes defined inductively by a
grammar such as the following, where p ranges over elements of P:
ϕ := p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ
By contrast, presenting a logico-pluralistic approach compels us to do
things slightly differently. Our main tactic in this section consists in shift-
ing logical connectives from the grammar into the signature of a language,
which is a principle particularly well known in the literature on HO logics.
This move facilitates definitions and assessments at a higher level of abstrac-
tion. Also note that, in the present account, substitutions do not operate on
propositional symbols or constants, and we will explicitly introduce variables
for that purpose.
Before getting started some remarks are pertinent: The present section aims
at building a conceptual framework and is thus rich in definitions. For each of
them we have provided one or several examples regarding well-known modal-
like systems which have been previously encoded using the SSE approach.
It is important to note that SSEs of non-modal systems are also possible
(Benzmu¨ller et al. 2019), their properties have just been less studied. Anyhow,
the ‘real-life’ illustration for the introduced notions occurs in our case study
in Section 6. In this exposition we strive for a middle path between readability
and rigor. We may switch between prefix and infix notation without warning,
and we may omit parenthesis when they can be easily inferred in context.
3.1 Propositional Signatures
We start with discussing propositional languages since, in spite of their sim-
plicity, they readily provide a perfect conceptual bridge towards the sort of
HO languages (based on functional STT) we utilize in the SSE approach. We
will gracefully skip FO logic, since, for practical purposes, formulating FO
languages as a fragment of an adequate HO language suffices.
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Definition 1 (P-Signature) A propositional signature, termed P-signature,
is a tuple S = 〈C,P0〉, where C is a non-empty, denumerable set of dis-
joint sets {Ck}k∈N, and P0 is a possibly empty, denumerable set {pn}n∈N.
The elements of each Ck are symbols called k-ary connectives and are al-
ways given a fixed (intended) interpretation. The elements of P0 are symbols,
called propositional constants, whose denotation varies in each interpretation.
P-signatures can be partially ordered. We have 〈C1,P10 〉 ≤ 〈C2,P20 〉 iff C1k ⊆ C2k
and P10 ⊆ P20 (analogously for < and ⊂). We define the union (intersection)
of P-signatures as the union (intersection) of their respective components:
S1 ∪ (∩)S2 = 〈{Ck}k∈N,P0〉, with Ck = C1k ∪ (∩) C2k and P0 = P10 ∪ (∩)P20 .
C and P0 can be seen as logical, resp. extralogical, base expressions of a
propositional language, and elements of P0 can be seen as having arity zero.
In the sequel, to avoid cluttering in our notation, all sets Ck which are not
explicitly mentioned are assumed to be empty. Signatures can be minimal or
non-minimal.
Example 1 (CPL) An exemplary P-signature for classical propositional logic
(CPL) with m propositional constants is: SCPL = 〈{Ck}k≤2, {pn}n<m〉, with
C0 = ∅, C1 = {¬} and C2 = {∧}. Notice that SCPL can be considered minimal;
other connectives can be defined the usual way.
Example 2 (IPL) An exemplary P-signature for intuitionistic propositional
logic (IPL) with m propositional constants is: SIPL = 〈{Ck}k≤2, {pn}n<m〉,
with C0 = {⊥}, C1 = {¬} and C2 = {∧,∨,→}. This signature is non-minimal
since, e.g., ¬ and ∨ could be defined based on the others. Moreover, note that
SCPL < SIPL.
Example 3 (ML) An exemplary P-signature for multi-modal propositional logic
with denumerable propositional constants is: SML = 〈{Ck}k≤2, {pn}n∈N〉, with
C0 = ∅, C1 = {¬} ∪ {n}n∈N and C2 = {∧}. Note that SCPL = SML ∩ SIPL.
3.2 Propositional Languages
Utilizing the notion of P-signatures, we introduce a technique to define dif-
ferent propositional languages inductively at a higher level of abstraction. A
relevant objective thereby is to keep the grammar fixed, so that only changes
in the signature can account for differences in the defined languages.
In addition to the symbols defined in the signature, we from now on assume
a fixed, denumerable set V0 = {vn}n∈N of schema variables.
Definition 2 (P-Language) The propositional language L = LP (S) over
the P-signature S = 〈{Ck}k∈N,P0〉 is the smallest set such that:
1. v, p, c ∈ LP (S) for every v ∈ V0, p ∈ P0, and c ∈ C0;
2. c(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) ∈ LP (S), whenever c ∈ Ck (k ≥ 1) and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ LP (S).
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Example 4 Each P-signature S presented in Ex. 1–3 induces a corresponding
propositional language LP (S) in the manner exposed above.
Definition 3 (Language Fragment) Let L1 and L2 be two languages,
i.e., there exist signatures S1 and S2 such that L1 = LP (S1) and L2 = LP (S2).
We say that L1 is a fragment of L2, and write L1 ≤ L2, iff L1 ⊆ L2. In a similar
vein, L1 is a proper fragment of L2, noted L1 < L2, iff L1 ⊂ L2.
Example 5 Language LP (SCPL) is a fragment of language LP (SIPL).
Notice that, in this exposition, languages are not simply sets of well-formed
formulas. Languages must be systematically generated (e.g., induced by a sig-
nature), and they are, among others, not closed under intersection or formula-
removal. This is why we won’t define any set-theoretical operations on lan-
guages. Moreover, note that the present characterization of a language frag-
ment is actually applicable to all languages induced by signatures, and not
only propositional ones.
Remark 1 (On derived connectives) Presentations of propositional languages
often include so-called derived connectives, which are actually abbreviations
(“syntactic sugar”) for sequences of connectives; e.g., in modal logics the op-
erator ♦ may simply abbreviate ¬¬. Note, however, that ¬¬ is not a well-
formed expression, and thus there is no proper way to characterize derived con-
nectives using P-signatures and the language-generating grammar presented
above. This contrasts with higher-order languages, introduced in Section 3.4,
which are equipped with a suitable functional abstraction mechanism.
3.3 Higher-order Signatures
In this section we introduce (functional) HO signatures as a straightforward
generalization of propositional signatures.
Definition 4 (Functional Type) We inductively define the following denu-
merable set τ :
– ιn ∈ τ for every n ∈ N;
– α  β ∈ τ , whenever α, β ∈ τ .
The elements of set τ are called functional types. They will play analogous roles
to the arities in P-signatures. We will use the following aliases for commonly
used (base) types: o for ι0, w for ι1, and e for ι2. Note that  associates to
the right, so that α  β  γ is shorthand for α  (β  γ). Moreover, αn  β
is shorthand for α  α  . . . (n−times) . . .  β.
We do not introduce product types, since they can (and will) be emulated
using functional types. For example, the product type (α×β)  η corresponds
to the functional type α  (β  η).6
6 As an illustration, in a functional language, a binary operator such as + : N × N  N
acquires the type: N  (N  N). This way we have, e.g., ((+ 3) 4) = 7 as a wff. The
underlying notion is known as Scho¨nfinkelization or Currying in the literature.
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Definition 5 (F-Signature) A functional type-theoretical signature, termed
F-signature, is a tuple S = 〈C,P〉, where C is a non-empty denumerable set
of (disjoint) sets {Cα}α∈τ , and where P is a (possibly empty) denumerable
set of (disjoint) sets {Pα}α∈τ . The elements of each Cα are symbols called
connectives of type α. They are always given a fixed (intended) interpretation.
The elements of each Pα are also symbols and they are called parameters (or
functional constants) of type α. Their denotation varies in each interpretation.
F-signatures can be partially ordered : we have 〈C1,P1〉 ≤ 〈C2,P2〉 iff C1α ⊆ C2α
and P1α ⊆ P2α (analogously for < and ⊂). Moreover, we define: S1 ∪ (∩)S2 =
〈{Cα}α∈τ , {Pα}α∈τ 〉, with Cα = C1α ∪ (∩) C2α and Pα = P1α ∪ (∩)P2α.
Observe that F-signatures do not feature λ-expressions, which appear in-
stead in the language-generating grammar as introduced below in Def. 6. In
doing this we aim at establishing a common ground for the analysis of signa-
tures and languages at a higher level of abstraction.
Example 6 (CPL-F) An exemplary F-signature for classical propositional logic
(CPL) with m propositional constants is: SCPL-F = 〈{Coo, Cooo}, {Po}〉,
with Coo = {¬}, Cooo = {∧} and Po = {pn}n<m. Compare this F-signature
with the corresponding P-signature as introduced in Ex. 1.
In Ex. 6 the types have been carefully chosen to reflect the intended in-
terpretation of the symbols in the signature. Type o is intended to represent
truth-values, and types o  o and o  o  o are intended to correspond to
unary and binary logical connectives, respectively. For the time being our ex-
position focuses on syntactic aspects. Semantical issues may gradually crop up
though, as we (informally) point out intended interpretations, and they will
become conspicuous when we discuss derived signatures in Section 4.1.
Example 7 (FOL-F) An exemplary F-signature for FO logic with equality
and countably many function symbols, m individual constant symbols, and n
unary predicate symbols is: SFOL-F = 〈{Coo, Cooo, Cee, Ceeo, C(eo)o},
{Pe,Peo}〉, with Coo = {¬}, Cooo = {∧,∨,→}, Cee = {fk}k∈N, Ceeo =
{=e}, C(eo)o = {Πe}, Pe = {pke}k<m, and Peo = {pkeo}k<n.7
In Ex. 7 the type e is intended to denote individuals, so that e  e becomes
the type for (unary) functions over individuals. In particular, the symbolΠe, of
type (e  o)  o, has a fixed intended interpretation as a special second-order
(SO) predicate assigning true to those unary predicates which are true of every
individual (of type e). More generally, Πα, for α ∈ τ of type (α  o)  o, has
a fixed interpretation as a special predicate assigning true to those predicates
of type α  o which are true of all of their arguments (of type α). We use
∀xα.ϕ as shorthand for Πα(λxα.ϕ) and, analogously, ∃xα.ϕ as shorthand for
¬Πα(λxα.¬ϕ).
7 Note that, when we have parameters for each type, we may use their type as an additional
label. This is to avoid defining a numbering mechanism for types.
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Example 8 (SOL) An exemplary F-signature for SO logic with relations and
with two SO predicate constants H1 and H2, but without any functions
symbols is: SSOL = 〈{Coo, Cooo} ∪ {C(eno)o}n∈N ∪ {C((eo)no)o}n∈N,
{P(eo)o}〉, with Coo = {¬}, Cooo = {∧,∨,→}, C(eo)o = {Πe},
C((eo)o)o = {Π(eo)}, and P(eo)o = {H1, H2}.
Example 9 (STT) An exemplary F-signature for Church’s simple type theory
(STT) with countably many parameters (for all types α ∈ τ) is:
SSTT = 〈{Co, Coo, Cooo}∪{C(αno)o}α∈τ,n∈N , {Pα}α∈τ 〉, with Co = {T, F},
Coo = {¬}, Cooo = {∧,∨,→}, C(αo)o = {Πα}, and Pα = {pkα}k∈N.
Example 10 (Minimal STT) A minimal F-signature for STT, cf. Andrews
(2002) and Benzmu¨ller and Andrews (2019), with countably many parame-
ters is: SSTT= = 〈{Cααo}α∈τ , {Pα}α∈τ 〉, with Cααo = {=α}, and Pα =
{pkα}k∈N.
Our above examples are motivated by the idea to provide uniform, compa-
rable and combinable characterizations of different logic languages, and this
will be very useful for supporting a more elegant presentation of the SSE
technique. We provide some further useful examples in this direction.
Example 11 (Relational structures) Consider the following F-signature for the
FO language of relational structures. Such a language can be used, in par-
ticular, to express and encode the semantics of propositional normal modal
logics using Kripke semantics (type w is then associated with possible worlds).
SFORS = 〈{Co, Coo, Cooo, C(wo)o}, {Pwo,Pwwo}〉, with Co = {T, F},
Coo = {¬}, Cooo = {∧,∨,→}, C(wo)o = {Πw}, Pwo = {pk}k∈N, and
Pwwo = {Rk}k∈N.
Example 12 (Neighborhood structures) Consider the following F-signature
for a SO language of neighborhood structures. Such a language can
be used to express and encode different sorts of semantics for propo-
sitional non-normal modal logics. This example features two sorts of
(“neighborhood”) functions for monadic and dyadic operators. (wo is
used as shorthand for type w  o to improve readability.) SSONS =
〈{Coo, Cooo, Cwoo, C(woo)o}, {Pwo,Pwowo,Pwowowo}〉, with Coo =
{¬}, Cooo = {∧,∨,→}, Cwoo = {Πw}, C(woo)o = {Πwo}, Pwo =
{pk}k∈N, Pwowo = {Nk1 }k∈N, and Pwowowo = {Nk2 }k∈N.
Remark 2 We give some further explanations. In semantical approaches to
(non-normal) modal and deontic logics (cf. minimal semantics (Chellas 1980)
or neighborhood semantics (Pacuit 2017)) so-called neighborhood functions
are usually introduced, in set-theoretical terms, as functions N(w) : W 
P(P(W )) (where W is the domain set and P(W ) its powerset) that assign
to each world w a set of sets: its neighborhood. This would correspond to
the functional type w  (w  o)  o. It is evident that N can be associated
with a function N∗(ϕ) : P(W )  P(W ), where N∗(ϕ) stands for the set of
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worlds to which ϕ gets assigned by N . This corresponds to the functional type
(w  o)  (w  o). The same rationale can be applied to dyadic neighbor-
hood functions, which thus get the type (w  o)  (w  o)  (w  o). Note
that Πw and Π(wo) (for quantifiers) range over worlds and propositions (sets
of worlds) respectively.
3.4 Higher-order Languages
Analogous to the propositional case, we define different HO languages induc-
tively at a higher level of abstraction. Again, the grammar is fixed for all
languages and only the signature changes from case to case. We thereby as-
sume a fixed, denumerable set V = {vkα}α∈τ,k∈N of variables.
Definition 6 (F-Language) The (HO) functional language L = LF (S) over
F-signature S = 〈C,P〉 is the smallest set defined inductively as:
1. v, p,A ∈ LF (S) for every v ∈ V, p ∈ Pα∈τ , and A ∈ Cα∈τ ;
2. (Aαβ Bα)β ∈ LF (S) whenever A,B ∈ LF (S) for all α, β in τ ;
3. (λxα.Aβ)αβ ∈ LF (S) whenever A ∈ LF (S) and x ∈ V for all α, β in τ .
The elements of an F-language, i.e., its well-formed formulas, are called terms;
terms of type o are sometimes called formulas.
We define the grounded8 language LFGr(S) over F-signature S = 〈C,P〉 as
the language over SGr = 〈C, ∅〉. A term is called closed if it does not contain
any free variables.9 We define the language of closed terms of a language L =
LF (S) as the subset of L consisting of all of its closed terms; this language is
noted Closed(L). Moreover, we lift the definition of (proper) fragment relation
to F-languages by adapting Def. 3 (L1 ≤ L2 iff L1 ⊆ L2 and L1 < L2 iff
L1 ⊂ L2).
Example 13 The F-signature presented in Ex. 6 induces a corresponding lan-
guage LF (SCPL-F). This language can have the same expressivity as the lan-
guage LP (SCPL) induced by its counterpart in Ex. 1 if we omit the last item
(concerning λ-abstraction) in the Def. 6 above.
Example 14 The F-signature presented in Ex. 7 induces a language
LF (SFOL-F), which corresponds to an extension of FO logic called extended
first-order logic (Brown and Smolka 2009), which restricts quantification and
equality to base type e but retains λ-abstractions and HO variables. Notice
that we can restrict the first and the last item in the Def. 6 above as suited to
our purposes.
8 For want of a better word, we call terms “grounded” when they are ‘parameter-free’.
Note that this does not coincide with the standard notion of “grounded” in the literature.
9 Free variables are those which appear either outside any λ-expression, or unbound inside
some λ-expression; cf. Benzmu¨ller and Andrews (2019) for a detailed exposition.
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Example 15 The F-signatures presented in Ex. 9 and Ex. 10 induce two lan-
guages LF (SSTT) and LF (SSTT=) resp. The latter language is indeed at least
as expressive as the first one, since the family of binary connectives =α can
be used to define all others. We refer the reader to Andrews (2002) for a
discussion.
Example 16 The F-signature presented in Ex. 11 induces a FO language
LF (SFORS) which can be used to articulate semantic conditions for classi-
cal normal modal logics in the style of Kripke semantics. Note that special
measures can be taken to remain inside a strict FO fragment, if desired.10
Example 17 The F-signature presented in Ex. 12 induces a SO language
LF (SSONS) which can be used to articulate semantic conditions for classi-
cal non-normal modal logics using a neighborhood semantics (Chellas 1980;
Pacuit 2017).
4 SSEs as Language Fragments and Translations
The notions introduced in this section are stated in a language- and signature-
agnostic way (e.g., dropping superscripts). As will become clear, they make
most sense for HO signatures and languages, as discussed previously. It is up
to the concerned reader to rephrase them for the propositional (or FO) setting
if desired, and to the extent that their reduced expressivity may allow.
4.1 Derived Signatures
A signature in our framework is composed of (type-indexed) sets of symbols,
further divided into connectives C and parameters P. Notice that these symbols
adopt a double role as both atomic building blocks and terms (i.e., well-formed
formulas) of a language. An interesting question thus is whether terms, in
general, can act as atomic building blocks in the construction of languages; or
more specifically, whether terms, being symbols11 too, can also adopt the role
of connectives in signatures. As we will see, we can give this question a partially
positive answer. For this we introduce the notion of derived signatures.
Informally, derived signatures are signatures where closed terms can play
the role of logical connectives. They are called derived because they rely on
an already existing language, itself induced by a different, ‘original’ signature.
In such cases we say that signature SD has been derived from signature S
10 See Ex. 13 and Ex. 14. We see, however, an advantage in this increased expressivity; as
it allows us to go beyond well-known limitations of Kripke semantics for modal logics, e.g.,
by encoding second-order frame conditions. As an example, current work on the SSE for
provability logic bears witness to this claim, since Go¨del-Lo¨b’s axiom GL : (ϕ → ϕ) →
ϕ imposes second-order restrictions on the frame’s accessibility relation, such as finiteness
or converse well-foundedness (Boolos 1995).
11 In the current context, we understand symbols as sequences of characters intended to
stand for (represent) something else (their denotation).
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and introduce the relation derived(SD,S) to indicate this. We thus say that
SD is a derived signature. Signatures which are not derived will be called
primitive (like the ones discussed so far). For the sake of further analysis, the
current notion will be divided into two categories: rigidly and flexibly derived
signatures, which will be formally defined below. Before that, let us introduce
the predicate rigid(S) to indicate that S is either primitive or rigidly derived,
and define ext(SE ,S) := derived(SE ,S) ∧ S ≤ SE , which expresses that a
signature SE is an extension of signature S.
Definition 7 (Rigidly Derived Signature) A rigidly derived signature is
a signature SD = 〈{CDα }α∈τ ,PD〉, where PD ⊆ P, and each element of CDα
belongs to Closed(LGr(S)) for some signature S = 〈C,P〉 such that rigid(S).
That is, the connectives of SD are closed terms of the grounded language over
S and its parameters are simply a subset of those of S, provided that S is
a rigid signature. Notice that the connectives so generated will get the same
interpretation in all models; in other words, they are rigidly interpreted (which
justifies the chosen wording). Rigidly derived signatures thus behave similarly
to primitive ones.
Definition 8 (Flexibly Derived Signature) Similarly, a flexibly derived
signature is a signature SD = 〈{CDα }α∈τ ,PD〉, where PD ⊆ P, and each
element of CDα belongs to Closed(L(S)) for some signature S = 〈C,P〉. That
is, the connectives of SD are closed terms of the language over S (without
further restrictions). Note that, since parameters are also closed terms of the
language L(S), the second component (PD) could actually be integrated into
the first. Also notice that the connectives so generated, in contrast to those of
a primitive or a rigidly derived signature, may get different interpretations in
different models, which justifies the qualifications ‘flexibly’ or ‘flexible’.
Proposition 1 Let S, SD be signatures such that derived(SD,S). We have:
1. L(SD) ≤ L(S) and L(S ∪ SD) = L(S).
2. If S ≤ SD, i.e., ext(SD,S), then L(SD) = L(S). In words: the extension
of a signature still generates the same language.
3. If S  SD, i.e., not ext(SD,S), then L(SD) < L(S). In words: a signature
which derives from, but does not extend, another one generates a strict
fragment (of the ‘original’ language).
4. If S∗ ≤ SD then derived(S∗,S). In words: subsets of derived signatures
are also derived (from the same ‘original’ signature).
Proof The proofs are straightforward and left to the reader.
Example 18 (STT signature as rigidly derived) As noted by Quine (1956)
and Henkin (1963), the signature SSTT can, in principle, be rigidly derived
from the signature SSTT= (both introduced in Ex. 9 and Ex. 10, respec-
tively). This implies that each connective of SSTT can be mapped to a term
of Closed(LGr(SSTT=)). Also note, from Prop. 1(3) above, that L(SSTT) can
be seen as a strict fragment of L(SSTT=).
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Example 19 (Relational and neighborhood signatures as rigidly derived) Note
that SFORS and SSONS (introduced in Ex. 11 and 12 for relational and neigh-
borhood structures respectively) are proper subsets of the signature SSTT.
Thus, by Prop. 1(4), they can also be derived (rigidly indeed) from the min-
imal signature SSTT= . It follows, from Prop. 1(3), that their corresponding
languages are strict fragments of L(SSTT), and thus also of L(SSTT=).
In the remainder of this section we introduce several examples illustrating
how several non-classical logics (particularly relevant to normative reasoning)
can be given as fragments of the HO language L(SSTT). We use wo (again) as
shorthand for type w  o, which can be understood as the type of characteristic
functions associated with truth sets (sets of possible worlds). Recalling Ex. 19,
we can see that each of the derived signatures introduced below is a strict
fragment of L(SSTT), and therefore also of L(SSTT=). First, we introduce the
following abbreviations; cf. Benzmu¨ller and Paulson (2013):
Definition 9 (Boolean operators as (w-type-lifted) STT terms)
∧˙ := λϕ.λψ.λw.(ϕ w) ∧ (ψ w) →˙ := λϕ.λψ.λw.(ϕ w)→ (ψ w)
∨˙ := λϕ.λψ.λw.(ϕ w) ∨ (ψ w) ¬˙ := λϕ.λw.¬(ϕ w)
Example 20 (Rigidly derived signature for S5U) We add the following ab-
breviation to those from Def. 9: ˙u := λϕ.λw.∀v.(ϕ v). A signature for
modal logic S5 with universal modality is given by SS5U = 〈{{¬˙, ˙u}wowo,
{∧˙, ∨˙, →˙}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo }〉, which has been rigidly derived from the sig-
nature SFORS for relational structures introduced in Ex. 11.
In the remainder each Ri represents an uninterpreted accessibility relation.
Similarly N i1 and N
i
2 represent unary and binary neighborhood functions resp.
Example 21 (Flexibly derived signature for MLK) We introduce the abbrevi-
ations ˙a := λϕ.λw.∀v.(R1 w) v → (ϕ v), ˙p := λϕ.λw.∀v.(R2 w) v → (ϕ v),
♦˙a := λϕ.¬˙ ˙a ¬˙ϕ, and ♦˙p := λϕ.¬˙ ˙p ¬˙ϕ. A signature for the (bimodal) nor-
mal modal logic (extendingK) is given by SMLK = 〈{{¬˙, ˙a, ♦˙a, ˙p, ♦˙p}wowo,
{∧˙, ∨˙, →˙}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo }〉, which is flexibly derived from the signature
for relational structures SFORS introduced in Ex. 11.
Example 22 (Flexibly derived signature for MDL) We use here the abbrevia-
tion: O˙ := λϕ.N11 ϕ. Now consider the following signature for the family of non-
normal monadic deontic logics (MDL) based on a minimal semantics (Chellas
1980): SSDL = 〈{{¬˙, O˙}wowo, {∧˙, ∨˙, →˙}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo }〉, which is flex-
ibly derived from the signature for neighborhood structures SSONS introduced
in Ex. 12.
Example 23 (Flexibly derived signature for DDL) We use here the abbrevi-
ations: O˙d := λψ.λϕ.(N12 ϕ) ψ, O˙
a := λϕ.λw.((N12 (R
1 w)) ϕ) w, and
O˙p := λϕ.λw.((N12 (R
2 w)) ϕ) w. Consider the following signature featur-
ing both monadic and dyadic deontic operators: SDDL = 〈{{¬˙, O˙a, O˙b}wowo,
{∧˙, ∨˙, →˙, O˙d}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo }〉, which has been flexibly derived from
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the signature SFORS ∪ SSONS. Observe that the signature for the DDL by
Carmo and Jones (2002), see also Benzmu¨ller et al. (2018), corresponds to
SCJDDL = SDDL ∪ SS5U ∪ SMLK, with the latter two as introduced in Ex. 20
and 21 respectively.
Remark 3 Notice that the (binary) functions N i2 (having as type: wo  wo 
wo) are different from (actually, a generalization of) the neighborhood func-
tions commonly used in dyadic deontic logics (DDL). For instance the function
ob(ϕ,ψ) : P(W )  P(P(W )), as introduced by e.g. Carmo and Jones (2002),
would correspond to the type wo  wo  o. Recall the discussion in 2 in Sec-
tion 3.3. Our approach has the advantage of facilitating a comparison with
algebraic semantics for modal logics (where unary resp. binary operators are
associated with types wo  wo resp. wo  wo  wo).
Example 24 (Flexibly derived signature for LFI) We use here the abbrevia-
tions: ¬˙p := λϕ. ϕ →˙ (N11 ϕ), and ◦˙ := λϕ. ¬˙(ϕ ∧˙ (N11 ϕ)) ∧˙ (N21 ϕ).
Consider the following signature for the (paraconsistent) logics of formal in-
consistency (LFI) with replacement,12 based on a neighborhood semantics:
SLFI = 〈{{¬˙p, ◦˙}wowo, {∧˙, ∨˙, →˙}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo }〉, which is flexibly de-
rived from the signature for neighborhood structures SSONS introduced in
Ex. 12.
Remark 4 (On logical vs. extralogical expressions) Note that some of the logi-
cal connectives of a flexibly derived signature are given varying interpretations
in different models. This is because they are articulated by employing parame-
ters (functional constants) such as, e.g., accessibility relations or neighborhood
functions. While this phenomenon is well-known in modal logic, our logico-
pluralist approach readily exploits (and generalizes) it by viewing the logic
of formalization as an additional degree of freedom in the process of logical
analysis of argumentative discourse, and thus blurring the distinction between
logical/extralogical (resp. syncategorematic/categorematic) expressions.
Moreover, we can leverage the conceptual tool of derived signatures to
define F-languages in much the same way as presented in Def. 6. When the
interpretation of their connectives corresponds to that for some particular
target logic, such a derived F-language can be said to be a shallow semantical
embedding (SSE). We can then define a corresponding predicate in the host
language modeling validity for terms of the embedded logic.
Definition 10 (SSEs as language fragments) Given a (derived) signature
ST (target), such that derived(ST ,SH) for some F-signature SH (host), and
an interpretation of the connectives of ST as the connectives of some logic LT ,
12 The class LFI of paraconsistent logics was introduced by Carnielli and Marcos (2002).
They feature a non-explosive negation ¬, as well as a (primitive or derived) consistency
connective ◦ which allows to recover the law of explosion in a controlled way (Carnielli
and Coniglio 2016b). It has been recently shown that some logics in the hierarchy of LFIs
(starting with the minimal logic mbC) can be enriched with replacement, and thus given
algebraic and neighborhood semantics (Carnielli et al. nodate).
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we say that LF (ST ) is a SSE for logic LT into LF (SH). We can then define a
term vld(·) ∈ LF (SH), such that vld(ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ LF (ST ) is to be considered as
logically valid or true.
Example 25 (SSE of MLK into STT) The (derived) F-language LF (SMLK)
generated from the derived signature SMLK (cf. Ex. 21)13 can be said to be a
SSE of modal logic K into STT. We define the predicate vld(·) := λϕ.(Πw ϕ).
It is worth mentioning that we can obtain faithful SSEs for canonical exten-
sions of modal logic K (systems KT, KB, S4, etc.) by adding the corresponding
restrictions to the accessibility relation as further STT axioms. The notion of
faithfulness is discussed in the following section.
4.2 SSEs as Translations – Faithfulness
We just saw one variant of the notion of SSEs, namely as the careful selection
of a fragment of a HO logical language, in our case STT, to host a target
logic. We conceive of this fragment as corresponding to some desired target
logical system. In this section, we will characterize another, related notion of a
shallow semantical embedding (SSE). Starting with an existing formal logical
system LT , encoded using a propositional or functional HO language (P- or
F-language, cf. Section 3) we will be able to systematically translate LT into
a corresponding fragment in a host F-language (STT), in a way that preserves
logical validity and consequence (i.e. in a faithful manner).
We start by building some useful conceptual background. Notice that the
notions of arities (as natural numbers) and functional types (as recursive struc-
tures) are quite similar in a sense: both are enumerable sets of well-formed ex-
pressions (which can be defined inductively), and both serve as ‘labels’ for the
connectives of a signature. We abstract from this and introduce the notion of
type domain as an inductively defined set whose elements will be called types.
Definition 11 (Type mapping) Given two type domains t1 and t2, a type
mapping is an function | · | : t1 → t2. Recalling the (functional) type domain
τ as introduced in Def. 4 and observing that we can take N as a type domain
(for arities), we define some particularly useful type mappings:
– The mapping from arities to (functional) types (arity-to-type) | · |σ : N→ τ
(with σ ∈ τ , where |0|σ = σ and |k|σ = σk  σ (with k ∈ N).
– The (functional) type-substitution mapping | · |β/α : τ → τ (with α, β ∈ τ),
where |ϕ|β/α is obtained by replacing all occurrences of α in ϕ by β.
– The type-lifting mapping is a special case of the latter: | · |ωσ := | · |ωσ/σ.
We introduce a more general notion of signature encompassing both P-
and F-signatures (and also FO signatures if defined appropriately): An (ab-
stract) signature over type domain t is just a type-indexed collection of sets
13 Recall that derived(SMLK,SFORS) and SFORS < SSTT, i.e. LF (SMLK) < LF (SSTT).
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of symbols St = {Sα}α∈t.14 Type mappings can be naturally extended to
structure-preserving mappings between components of signatures, which we
term signature morphisms.15
Definition 12 (Signature morphism) Let St1 = {St1α }α∈t1 and St2 =
{St2α }α∈t2 be signatures over type domains t1 and t2; and let | · | : t1 → t2
be a corresponding type mapping. A signature morphism | · | : St1 → St2 is
a family of maps hα : S
t1
α → St2|α|, for every α ∈ t1. A signature morphism is
always total but in general not surjective (i.e. an ‘embedding’).
Signature morphisms induce syntactical ‘translation’ mappings between
languages. ||·|| : L(St1)  L(St2). However, translations proper involve further
restrictions.16
Definition 13 ((Conservative) translation) Let `L1 and `L2 be the con-
sequence relations associated with two logical systems with languages L1 and
L2 respectively, and P1, P2, . . . , Pn and C be arbitrary formulas from L1, the
mapping || · || : L1  L2 is a (conservative) translation when:
||P1||, ||P2||, . . . , ||Pn|| `L2 ||C|| if (and only if) P1, P2, . . . , Pn `L1 C
Definition 14 ((Faithful) SSEs as (conservative) translations) Given
a target language L(St) for type domain t and a host (F-)language L(F )(Sτ ),
let us define the corresponding type mapping | · | : t → τ and extend it to a
signature morphism | · | : St → Στ , where derived(Στ ,Sτ ), thus inducing a
translation mapping || · || : L(St)  L(Sτ ) (remember that L(Στ ) ≤ L(Sτ )
by Prop. 1(1)). This signature morphism together with some special meta-
logical validity (or truth) predicate vld(·) ∈ L(Sτ ), is called a (faithful) shallow
semantical embedding of L(St) into the HO logic with language L(Sτ ), when
it induces a (conservative) translation in the manner shown below:
vld(||P1||), . . . , vld(||Pn||) `HOL vld(||C||) if (and only if) P1, . . . , Pn `TL C
`TL and `HOL correspond to the consequence relations for the target logic
and the host (HO) logic resp. Observe that the definition above corresponds to
the notion of global validity. In special cases (e.g. modal logics) we can exploit
the deduction metatheorem to define a (faithful) SSE for local validity as:
`HOL vld(||P1 → . . .→ Pn → C||) if (and only if) P1, . . . , Pn `TL(local) C
14 At this level of abstraction we have no need to differentiate between connectives and
parameters. F-signatures can directly be given as (abstract) signatures. For P-signatures we
note that every propositional constant p ∈ P can be seen as having arity (i.e., type) zero.
15 The notion presented here is a variant of that introduced by Carnielli et al. (2008,
Ch. 7). To make this exposition more self-contained and simple we have sidestepped the
use of notions from categorial logic (Abramsky et al. 2000) and the theory of institutions
(Goguen and Burstall 1992).
16 See Carnielli et al. (2009), and references therein, for a more thorough discussion of the
notion of translations.
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For the following illustrative example we reuse the abbreviations defined
in Def. 9 and append the following: ˙ := λϕ.λw.∀v.(R1 w) v → (ϕ v).
Example 26 (SSE of ML into STT) Given the following P-signature for modal
propositional logic (recall also Ex. 3):
SML = 〈{{¬,}1, {∧,∨,→}2}, {pk}k∈N0 〉.
Now consider the following F-signature flexibly derived from signature SFORS
(Ex. 11) for the language of relational structures:
SFORS* = 〈{{¬˙, ˙}wowo, {∧˙, ∨˙}wowowo}, {{pk}k∈Nwo , {R1}wwo}〉
and the signature morphism induced by arity-to-type mapping | · |wo : N  wo
(Def 11), such that
| pk |wo = pk, | ¬ |wo = ¬˙, | |wo = ˙,
| ∧ |wo = ∧˙, | ∨ |wo = ∨˙, | → |wo = λϕ.λψ. ¬˙ϕ ∨˙ ψ.
This signature morphism together with the L(SFORS) term17
vld(·) := λϕ.(Πw ϕ)
defines a SSE of L(SML) into the relational language L(SFORS) ≤ L(SSTT).
Hence we obtain a faithful SSE of the language of (mono-)modal logic into
STT. The faithfulness of (a multi-modal generalization of) this SSE has been
proved in Benzmu¨ller and Paulson (2010).
Remark 5 Compare Ex. 26 with Ex. 25. The end result is, mutatis mutandis,
similar in both. Observe that, in the case of SSEs as ‘plain’ language fragments
(Def. 10) the question of faithfulness may not appear if the target logic becomes
defined as the corresponding fragment of the host F-language (STT). This can
happen in the case of logic combinations, which quite often do not correspond
to any existent (i.e. previously studied) logical system.
4.3 SSEs of logic combinations
We have previously explored two related characterizations of the notion of shal-
low semantical embeddings (SSE); the first as language fragments (Def. 10),
and the second as translations (Def. 14). We saw that the second characteri-
zation allows us to articulate a notion of faithfulness in a very precise manner.
Yet SSEs of logical systems and their combinations, employing the first notion,
may often involve a tacit faithfulness claim. Let us consider the following:
17 Observe that according to the definition of SSE (Def. 14) the term vld(·) may feature
additional connectives (Πw in this case) not part of SFORS*, while still part of SFORS.
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Example 27 (SSE of QML into STT) We can obtain a signature for quantified
modal logic (QML) by ‘merging’ signatures (analogously to what we showed in
Ex. 23). In this case the signatures would correspond to (world-lifted) FO logic
(Ex. 7) and modal logic K (Ex. 21). A SSE of QML (in the first sense) would
thus amount to: LF (SMLK ∪ |SFOL-F|wo/o), where | · |wo/o stands for the
signature morphism extending the corresponding type-lifting mapping (recall
Defs. 11 and 12). We have vld(·) := λϕ.(Πw ϕ) as before.
An SSE for a quantified modal logic (extending QML in Ex. 27) has been
proved faithful by Benzmu¨ller and Paulson (2013).
We can also define, in an analogous manner, an SSE for the DDL by Carmo
and Jones (2002), whose signature we introduced in Ex. 23. We note that the
corresponding semantical constraints on N12 , R
1 and R2, when encoded in the
host language, LF (SSTT), give rise to a faithful SSE (Benzmu¨ller et al. 2018).
Among several others, faithful SSEs also exist for quantified conditional logics
(Benzmu¨ller 2017), as well as for I/O logic (Benzmu¨ller et al. 2019), and free
logic (Benzmu¨ller and Scott 2020).
It is worth highlighting that the conceptual framework introduced in this
section provides a more intuitive grasp of the relationship between SSE and
other approaches to combining logics, such as algebraic fibring, a generalization
of fusion of modal logics, cf. Carnielli and Coniglio (2016a). Combining propo-
sitional logics by ‘merging signatures’, as illustrated in Ex. 23 for the DDL
by Carmo and Jones (2002), can indeed be seen as an instance of the gen-
eral notion of algebraic fibring (Carnielli et al. 2008). Theoretical connections
between algebraic fibring and SSE of combinations of logics are still ongoing
work and remain largely unexplored.
5 Encoding Formal Argumentation
5.1 Notions of Formal Argumentation
We follow on the footsteps of previous work depicting the logical analysis of ar-
gumentative discourse as a hermeneutical process (Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller
2019a,b), whereby informal arguments become initially reconstructed as for-
malized enthymemes and, after that, incrementally evolve towards purely for-
mal deductions satisfying further inferential adequacy criteria (including, among
others, consistency and minimality). We thus conceive of a formal argument
(quite generally) as a labeled pair consisting of (i) an identifier, (ii) a set of
formulas (premises), together with (iii) a formula (conclusion); where both (ii)
and (iii) are articulated using a certain logic for formalization. We reserve the
adjective deductive for those arguments in which the premises logically entail
the conclusion.
Definition 15 ((Deductive) Argument) An argument is a labeled ordered
pair A : 〈ϕ, α〉, where A is an identifier (label) and ϕ∪{α} is a set of formulas
of the language of some underlying logic L. An argument A is said to be
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deductive (modulo logic L) if additionally ϕ `L α. The formulas in ϕ are the
premises (aka. assumptions or support) of the argument, and the formula α is
the conclusion (or claim) of the argument.
Other constraints we may optionally set on arguments are consistency: ϕ
has to be logically consistent (according to the chosen logic L); and minimality:
there is no ψ ⊂ ϕ such that ψ `L α. For an argument A : 〈ϕ, α〉 the function
Premises(A) returns ϕ (in a specific order) and Conclusion(A) returns {α}.
Observe that this definition is more permissive than others in the liter-
ature; cf. in particular deductive argumentation (Besnard and Hunter 2014).
The ‘lifecycle’ of an argument can be followed with the aid of its identifier.
Every pair 〈ϕ, α〉 can be seen as the current ‘snapshot’ of a certain argument
during the give-and-take, iterative process of formal reconstruction. Hence this
‘evolving argument’ will, now and again, become logically valid, consistent, or
minimal depending on its current state and, quite importantly, on the current
formalization logic. In line with the SSE approach, this (object) logic amounts
to the currently chosen fragment of STT used to encode argument’s sentences
(recall the discussion in Section 4).
Similarly to other approaches towards structured argumentation (Baroni
et al. 2018), different kinds of attack relations between arguments (defeaters,
undercuts, rebuttals, etc.) can be easily introduced and interrelated in the
meta-logic. However, in the present work we limit ourselves to a quite general
notion: an attack between (a set of) argument(s) A and argument B corre-
sponds to the inconsistency (modulo the meta-logic, e.g. STT) of the set of
formulas formed by the conclusion(s) of A together with the premises of B.
We also consider support relations between arguments in an analogous man-
ner, where the conclusion(s) of (a set of) argument(s) A logically entails B in
the meta-logic.18 Notice that our framework allows us to extend the notions
of attack (support) to the case where two (or more) arguments jointly attack
(support) another.
Definition 16 (Attack) An argument A attacks argument B iff the set Con-
clusion(A) ∪ Premises(B) is inconsistent. This definition can be seamlessly
extended to two (or more) arguments: A1 and A2 (jointly) attack B iff the set
Conclusion(A1) ∪ Conclusion(A2) ∪ Premises(B) is inconsistent.
Notice that this definition subsumes the more traditional one for classical
logic, Conclusion(A) ` ¬∧X for some X ⊆Premises(B), while allowing for
paraconsistent formalization logics where explosion (inconsistency) does not
necessarily follow from pairs of contradictory formulas (recall Ex. 24).
Definition 17 (Support) An argument A supports argument B iff Conclu-
sion(A) ` X for some X ∈ Premises(B). This definition can be seamlessly
extended to two (or more) arguments: A1 and A2 (jointly) support B iff
Conclusion(A1) ∪ Conclusion(A2) ` X for some X ∈ Premises(B).
18 Our notion of argument support is different, though not unrelated, to other notions in
the literature; cf. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex (2009) and Prakken (2018); cf. also Baroni
et al. (2018) and Cohen et al. (2014) for a more comprehensive overview.
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At this point, we would like to highlight the similarity in spirit between
ours and the “descriptive approach” (Besnard and Hunter 2014) towards recon-
structing argument graphs from natural-language sources, in which we carry
out a reconstruction process taking as input an abstract argument graph, to-
gether with some informal text description of each argument. The task thus be-
comes one of finding the appropriate logical formulas for encoding the premises
and conclusion of each argument, according to the choice of the logic of for-
malization. As will be illustrated in the case study in Section 6, there is often a
need for finding appropriate ‘implicit’ premises which render the individual ar-
guments logically valid and additionally honor their intended dialectical role in
the input abstract graph (i.e., attacking or supporting other arguments). This
interpretive aspect, in particular, has been emphasized in our computational
hermeneutics approach (Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2019a,b), as well as the
possibility of modifying (or reconstructing) the input abstract argument graph
as new insights, resulting from the formalization process, appear. In their expo-
sition of structured, deductive argumentation, Besnard and Hunter (2014) duly
highlight these aspects and, quite important for us, they emphasize the fact
that “richer” logic formalisms (i.e., more expressive than “rule-based” ones)
appear more appropriate for reconstructing “real-world arguments” in spite of
their higher computational complexity. Such representational and interpretive
issues are tackled in our approach by the use of different (combinations of)
non-classical and higher-order logics for formalization. For this we utilize the
shallow semantical embeddings (SSE) approach as introduced in the previous
sections.
5.2 Isabelle/HOL encoding
The claim that an argument, or a set of arguments, attacks or supports another
argument is, in our approach, conceived as (the claim of) an argument in itself.
This argument needs to be reconstructed as logically valid in the meta-logic,
eventually by adding implicit (meta-logical) premises. As an illustration, we
introduce a term encoded in the language of Church’s simple type theory STT
(cf. Ex. 9 and Ex. 15) which models the notion of attack discussed above:
attacks1 := λϕ.λψ. (ϕ ∧ ψ) → F
The type of the term attacks1 above is o  o  o, corresponding to a bi-
nary predicate. In a similar spirit we can introduce other dialectical relations.
We illustrate below the corresponding definitions employing Isabelle/HOL syn-
tax. Notice that the symbols are slightly different. We use Isabelle’s keyword
abbreviation to introduce these definitions as syntactic shorthand.
abbreviation attacks1 ϕ ψ ≡ (ϕ ∧ ψ) −→ False — one attacker
abbreviation supports1 ϕ ψ ≡ ϕ −→ ψ — one supporter
abbreviation attacks2 γ ϕ ψ ≡ (γ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ) −→ False — two attackers
abbreviation supports2 γ ϕ ψ ≡ (γ ∧ ϕ) −→ ψ — two supporters
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6 Case Study: Climate Engineering Debate
6.1 Background
Climate Engineering (CE), aka. Geo-engineering, is the intentional large-scale
intervention in the Earth’s climate system in order to counter climate change.
Proposed CE technologies (e.g., solar radiation management, carbon dioxide
removal) are highly controversial, spurring global debates about whether and
under which conditions they should be considered. Criticisms to CE range
from diverting attention and resources from much needed mitigation policies to
potentially catastrophic side-effects; thus the cure may become worse than the
disease. The analyzed arguments around the CE debate presented in this paper
originate from the book of Betz and Cacean (2012), which is a slightly modified
and updated translation of a study commissioned by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) on “Ethical Aspects of Climate
Engineering” finalized in spring 2011.19 The illustrative analysis carried out in
the present paper focuses on a small subset of the CE argumentative landscape,
namely on those arguments concerned with the “ethics of risk” (Betz and
Cacean 2012 p. 38ff.) which point out (potentially dangerous) uncertainties in
future deployment of CE.20
6.2 Individual (Component) Arguments
As has been observed by Betz and Cacean, incalculable side-effects and im-
ponderables constitute one of the main reasons against CE technology deploy-
ment. Thus, arguments from the ethics of risk primarily support the thesis:
“CE deployment is morally wrong” and make for an argument cluster with a
non-trivial dialectical structure which we aim at reconstructing in this section.
We focus on six arguments from the ethics of risk, which entail that the de-
ployment of CE technologies (today as in the future) is not desirable because
of being morally wrong (argument A22). Supporting arguments of A22 are:
A45, A46, A47, A48, A49 (using the original notation by Betz and Cacean). In
particular, two of these arguments, namely A48 and A49, are further attacked
by A50 and A51.21
19 Betz and Cacean’s work aimed at providing a quite complete overview of the arguments
around CE at the time. However, since the CE controversy has been advancing rapidly, it
is to expect that their work has partially become outdated meanwhile.
20 Isabelle/HOL sources for this case study have been made available online (https:
//github.com/davfuenmayor/CE-Debate).
21 We strive to remain as close as possible to the original argument network as intro-
duced by Betz and Cacean (2012) (with one exception concerning the dialectical relation
among arguments A47, A48, A50 and A22, which will be commented upon later on). The
reader will notice that some of the arguments could have been merged together. However,
Betz and Cacean have deliberately decided not to do so. We conjecture that this is due to
traceability concerns, given the fact that most arguments have been compiled from differ-
ent bibliographic sources and authors; cf. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex (2009) and Prakken
(2018) for a discussion on this sort of issues.
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A50 A51
A47 A48 A49 A45 A46
⊕
A22
− − −
+
+ +
Fig. 2 Abstract argumentation network for the ethics of risk cluster in the CE debate
(arrows labeled with +/- indicate support/attack); ⊕ indicates a joint support.
6.2.1 Ethics of Risk Argument (A22)
CE deployment is not desirable since it is morally wrong. This argument has
as premise: “CE deployment is morally wrong” and as conclusion: “CE deploy-
ment is not desirable”. Notice that both sentences are formalized as (Boolean-
valued) propositions. We are thus restricting ourselves, for the time being, to
a propositional logic. We introduce two new, uninterpreted propositional con-
stants (“CEisWrong” and “CEisNotDesirable”) and interrelate them by means
of an implicit premise (“If CE is morally wrong then it is not desirable”).
Since this is the first argument to be represented in the proof assistant Is-
abelle/HOL in this work, we will pay special attention to the syntactic elements
used for its formulation in the system. First notice the use of the keyword con-
sts to introduce the following non-interpreted constants; their type being bool
(corresponding to type o in the exposition in Section 3.3).
consts CEisWrong ::bool — uses Boolean type
consts CEisNotDesirable::bool
Below we employ the keyword definition to introduce interpreted con-
stants (of Boolean type). The first two definitions introduce an explicit and an
implicit premise, labeled A22-P1 and A22-P2 respectively, and the third one
introduces its conclusion, labeled A22-C.22 Definitions introduce an equiva-
lence between two formulas (by employing the symbol ≡) with the definiendum
on its left-hand side and the definiens on its right-hand side.
definition A22-P1 ≡ CEisWrong
definition A22-P2 ≡ CEisWrong −→ CEisNotDesirable — implicit premise
definition A22-C ≡ CEisNotDesirable
22 Notice that we will keep this same notational convention throughout this work: an
argument identifier, say A99, followed by a hyphen and either a letter P followed by a
premise number (say 2), or by a letter C. For example A99-P2 stands for Premises(A99)[2]
and A99-C stands for Conclusion(A99). Recall the discussion in Section 5.
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Observe that the object logic employed to formalize this argument corre-
sponds to a propositional fragment of STT, e.g., by employing the F-signature
SCPL from Ex. 6. Since LF (SCPL) ≤ LF (SSTT), this encoding can be con-
sidered an SSE of the sort discussed in Def. 10. The second SSE approach
(recalling Section 4.2) would have as starting point a classical propositional
logic (using P-signature SCPL from Ex. 1) and then extend the arity-to-type
mapping (Def. 11) | · |o : N→ τ into a signature morphism (recall Def. 14). Ob-
serve that such an SSE is trivially faithful. Note also that we use the deduction
meta-theorem of classical propositional logic to encode A1, A2, . . . , An `CPL B
as A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧An → B.23
Below we employ the model finder Nitpick (Blanchette and Nipkow 2010)
to find a model (not shown here) satisfying both premises and conclusion of
the formalized argument. This shows consistency.
lemma A22-P1 ∧ A22-P2 −→ A22-C nitpick [satisfy ] oops — model
This first argument (A22) serves as a quite straightforward illustration
of the role of implicit, unstated premises in enabling the reconstruction of a
candidate argument as a deductive argument. In this first example, we utilize
Isabelle’s simplifier (term rewriting engine) to verify that the conclusion follows
from the premises.
theorem A22-valid : A22-P1 ∧ A22-P2 −→ A22-C
unfolding A22-C-def A22-P1-def A22-P2-def by simp — proved
6.2.2 Termination Problem (A45)
CE measures do not possess viable exit options. If deployment is terminated
abruptly, catastrophic climate change ensues.24 This argument (in the given
formulation) corresponds to a sort of causal conditional25 and can be seen
as an enthymeme with both an implicit premise and an implicit conclusion.
We add as implicit premise (A45-P1) that there is a real possibility of CE
interventions being terminated abruptly. The dreaded conclusion being the
possibility of a CE-caused catastrophe (A45-C).
Observe that we are employing a possible-worlds semantics for our logic of
formalization. The type of propositional atoms is thus w⇒bool, which corre-
sponds to the type for characteristic functions of sets of worlds.
23 These considerations are, for sure, an overkill at the present moment, but they duly
illustrate the issues at stake and prepare the ground for modal object logics.
24 Cf. Betz and Cacean (2012) for sources for these and other proposed theses and argu-
ments in the CE debate.
25 As mentioned before, we employ in our analysis a material conditional for simplicity of
exposition. Other, more appropriate, conditional operators can be employed. For instance,
a faithful SSE of a quantified conditional logic has been presented by Benzmu¨ller (2017).
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consts CEisTerminated ::w⇒bool — uses type for (world-lifted) propositions
consts CEisCatastrophic::w⇒bool
definition A45-P1 ≡ ♦CEisTerminated — implicit premise
definition A45-P2 ≡ CEisTerminated → CEisCatastrophic
definition A45-C ≡ ♦CEisCatastrophic — implicit conclusion
Notice that we have introduced in the above formalization the modal oper-
ator ♦ to signify that a proposition is possibly true. The logic of formalization
for this argument corresponds to a modal logic K, i.e., the modal logic dis-
cussed in the Examples 25 and 26. Hence, this can be seen as an SSE of the
sorts discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The expression vld(ϕ) in the SSE for modal logics (see Def. 10 and Def. 14)
is represented as [` ϕ] in the Isabelle/HOL encoding; it corresponds to global
truth in modal logic, i.e., truth in all worlds, formalized as: Πw ϕ (i.e. ∀w.ϕ w).
In particular, observe that we employ the notion of global consequence for
the formalization of this argument in modal logic, and whose definition in
Isabelle/HOL is also illustrated below.
abbreviation valid ::wo⇒bool ([` -]) where
[` ϕ] ≡ ∀w . ϕ w
abbreviation conseq-global ::wo⇒wo⇒bool ([- `g -]) where
[ϕ `g ψ] ≡ [` ϕ] −→ [` ψ]
abbreviation conseq-global2 ::wo⇒wo⇒wo⇒bool ([-,- `g -]) where
[ϕ, γ `g ψ] ≡ [` ϕ] −→ ([` γ] −→ [` ψ])
Having defined above the object-logical notion of logical consequence for
our SSE (Def. 14), we can now formulate the argument and (i) verify that it is
consistent by finding a satisfying model using model finder Nitpick (Blanchette
and Nipkow 2010), and (ii) prove it by using the tableau prover blast. Both
tools come integrated into Isabelle/HOL.
lemma [A45-P1 , A45-P2 `g A45-C ] nitpick [satisfy ] oops — model found
theorem A45-valid : [A45-P1 , A45-P2 `g A45-C ]
unfolding A45-C-def A45-P1-def A45-P2-def by blast — proved by tableaus
6.2.3 No Long-term Risk Control (A46)
Our social systems and institutions are possibly not capable of controlling risk
technologies on long time scales and of ensuring that they are handled with
proper technical care (Betz and Cacean 2012). Notice that we can make best
sense of this objection as (implicitly) presupposing a risk of CE-caused catas-
trophes (A46-P2).
consts RiskControlAbility ::w⇒bool — uses type for (world-lifted) propositions
definition A46-P1 ≡ ♦¬RiskControlAbility
definition A46-P2 ≡ ¬RiskControlAbility→ ♦CEisCatastrophic — implicit
26 David Fuenmayor, Christoph Benzmu¨ller
definition A46-C ≡ ♦CEisCatastrophic
lemma [A46-P1 , A46-P2 `g A46-C ] nitpick [satisfy ] oops — model found
lemma [A46-P1 , A46-P2 `g A46-C ] nitpick oops — countermodel found
As before, we can use automated tools to help us find further implicit
premises, which may actually correspond to modifications to the logic of for-
malization. As shown above by model finder Nitpick, the argument A46 is
contingent: it is both satisfiable and countersatisfiable. An quick examination
of the presented countermodels showed that a stronger base logic, namely
modal logic K4, makes A46 deductive. This means: we need to postulate the
so-called axiom “4”: [` ϕ→ ϕ] (which can be read intuitively as: “neces-
sary propositions are so, necessarily”). It is well known that this axiom corre-
sponds to assuming transitivity of the underlying accessibility relation, as we
do below. First observe that a (meta-logical) inference can be represented in
Isabelle/HOL notation as assumes ϕ1 and . . . ϕn shows α.
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theorem A46-valid : assumes Transitive aRel
shows [A46-P1 , A46-P2 `g A46-C ]
unfolding A46-C-def A46-P1-def A46-P2-def using assms by blast
6.2.4 CE Interventions are Irreversible (A47)
As presented by Betz and Cacean (2012), the next two arguments consist of
a simple sentence (their conclusion). The present argument states that CE
represents an irreversible intervention, i.e., that once the first interventions in
world’s climate have been set in motion, there is no way to ‘undo’ them. We
will be working with a predicate logic, and thus introduce an additional type
e for actions (interventions). We also extend our base logic with quantifiers,
thus obtaining a quantified modal logic (QML) of formalization (Ex. 27).
typedecl e — new type for actions
consts CEAction::e⇒w⇒bool — uses type for (world-lifted) predicates
consts Irreversible::e⇒w⇒bool
definition A47-C ≡ ∀ I . CEAction(I ) → Irreversible(I )
26 The logic of Isabelle/HOL is based upon (higher-order) Gentzen-type natural deduc-
tion (Nipkow et al. 2002). Our implementation thus handles arguments as (sequent-like)
inferences independently from each other. This is different than having the premises for all
arguments as axioms in a same theory resp. knowledge-base and drawing conclusions as the-
orems. In the current approach, our knowledge-base is a set of definitions; two arguments
with mutually inconsistent premises will not cause any problems nor trivialize anything.
Moreover, conflicting arguments with, prima facie, the same premises are also possible; the
cause for the conflicting conclusions is to be found in additional (implicit) premises.
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6.2.5 No Ability to Retain Options after Irreversible Interventions (A48)
A48 claims that irreversible interventions (of any kind) narrow the options of
future generations in an unacceptable way, i.e., it is wrong to carry them out.
consts WrongAction::e⇒w⇒bool — uses type for (world-lifted) predicates
definition A48-C ≡ ∀ I . Irreversible(I ) → WrongAction(I )
6.2.6 Unpredictable Side-Effects are Wrong (A49)
As long as the side-effects of CE technologies cannot be reliably predicted,
their deployment is morally wrong. This argument states two things: (i) CE
interventions have unpredictable side-effects, and (ii) CE interventions are
wrong. We aim at having (i) entail (ii). An additional (implicit) premise, A49-
P2, suggests that interventions with unpredictable side-effects are wrong.
consts USideEffects::e⇒w⇒bool — uses type for (world-lifted) predicates
definition A49-P1 ≡ ∀ I . CEAction(I ) → USideEffects(I )
definition A49-P2 ≡ ∀ I . USideEffects(I ) → WrongAction(I ) — implicit
definition A49-C ≡ ∀ I . CEAction(I ) → WrongAction(I )
We take the opportunity to illustrate an alternative consequence relation
for base logic, namely a local consequence relation, exploiting the deduction
meta-theorem for modal-like logics (recall the discussion in Def. 14).
abbreviation conseq-local2 ::wo⇒wo⇒wo⇒bool ([-,- `l -]) where
[ϕ, γ `l ψ] ≡ [` ϕ → (γ → ψ)]
lemma [A49-P1 , A49-P2 `l A49-C ] nitpick [satisfy ] oops — model found
theorem A49-valid : [A49-P1 , A49-P2 `l A49-C ]
unfolding A49-C-def A49-P1-def A49-P2-def by simp — proved
6.2.7 Mitigation is also Irreversible (A50)
Mitigation of climate change (i.e., the ‘preventive alternative’ to CE), too, is,
to some extent, an irreversible intervention with unforeseen side-effects.
consts Mitigation::e — uses type for actions/interventions
definition A50-C ≡ Irreversible(Mitigation) ∧ USideEffects(Mitigation)
6.2.8 All Interventions have Unpredictable Side-Effects (A51)
This defense of CE states that we do never completely foresee the consequences
of our actions, and thus aims at somehow trivializing the concerns regarding
unforeseen side-effects of CE.
definition A51-C ≡ ∀ I . USideEffects(I )
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6.3 Reconstructing the Argument Graph
Recalling our discussion in Section 5, the claim that an argument (or a set of ar-
guments) attacks or supports another argument is, in our approach, conceived
as (the claim of) an argument in itself, which also needs to be reconstructed
as logically valid (i.e. as a deductive argument, optionally consistent and min-
imal), either by tweaking the formalization of sentences, or, as we show, by
adding additional premises. Those new premises may range from unstated, ‘im-
plicit’ argumentative assumptions, over meaning postulates (of a more or less
definitional nature), to axioms and definitions constraining the interpretation
of the logical connectives of our underlying (object) logic. A philosophically
provocative feature of the shallow semantical embeddings (SSE) approach is
that it remains agnostic as regards these alternatives, as the only thing it
‘sees’ are expressions in the meta-logic (STT/HOL). This blurres in a sense
the distinction between logical and extralogical (resp., syncategorematic and
categorematic) expressions.
In this spirit, SSEs entitles us to formalize the following question in the
meta-logic: “Does argument(s) A attack (support) argument B?”, even in cases
where A and B are formalized using different (object) logics. In case of a
negative answer (maybe elicited with the help of automated tools), we have
the opportunity to ‘patch’ the corresponding argument (recall Fig. 1 and the
discussion in Section 2).27
We will encode support, resp. attack, claims as meta-logical theorems. As
usual, they have to become logically entailed from a collection of premises.
We thus have e.g., ϕ1, . . . ϕn `HOL attacks(A,B), where ϕn stands for a
meta-logical formula (e.g. a semantical condition on some logical connective)
and `HOL stands for the consequence relation in the higher-order meta-logic.28
6.3.1 Does A45 support A22?
When combining several object logics in a same (meta-logical) inference, we
employ the corresponding vld(·) predicate (recall Def. 14) as defined for each
object logic. For instance, for modal logics the expression vld(ϕ) := [` ϕ]
for some term ϕ has been previously defined as global truth, i.e., truth in all
worlds, and formalized as Πw ϕ (i.e. ∀w.ϕ w), recalling Section 4.
In this example we reconstruct a support relation as a deductive inference.
Let us recall the corresponding definitions: A45-C ≡ ♦CEisCatastrophic (type
w  o) and A22-P1 ≡ CEisWrong (type o). Observe how the implicit premise
becomes formalized in a fragment of the meta-logic (STT/HOL) resulting from
the combination of the fragments corresponding to each argument (cf. Fig. 1).
27 This corresponds indeed to an abductive procedure carried out in the meta-logic
(STT/HOL). At present, the automation of abductive reasoning for expressive (first- and
higher-order) logics is an underdeveloped area. We thus count on leveraging human inge-
nuity with the help of state-of-the-art automated reasoning technology, in particular proof
assistants like Isabelle/HOL (cf. the discussion in Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2019a, §4).
28 Recall that a (meta-logical) inference is represented in our employed Isabelle/HOL no-
tation as assumes ϕ1 and . . . ϕn shows α.
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In this example, as in others, we have utilized three kinds of automated
tools integrated into Isabelle/HOL: the model finder Nitpick (Blanchette and
Nipkow 2010), which finds a counterexample to the claim that A45 supports
A22 (without further implicit premises); the tableau prover blast, which can
indeed verify that, by adding an implicit premise (If CE is possibly catas-
trophic then its deployment is wrong), the support relation obtains; and the
“hammer” tool Sledgehammer (Blanchette et al. 2013), which automagically
finds minimal sets of assumptions needed to prove a theorem.
lemma supports1 [`A45-C ] A22-P1 nitpick oops — countermodel found
theorem assumes [` ♦CEisCatastrophic → (λw . CEisWrong)] — implicit
shows supports1 [`A45-C ] A22-P1
unfolding A22-P1-def A45-C-def using assms by blast — proved
6.3.2 Does A46 support A22?
This reconstruction is similar as the previous, reusing the same implicit premise.
Let us recall the definition: A46-C ≡ ♦CEisCatastrophic.
lemma supports1 [`A46-C ] A22-P1 nitpick oops — countermodel found
theorem assumes [` ♦CEisCatastrophic → (λw . CEisWrong)] — implicit
shows supports1 [`A46-C ] A22-P1
unfolding A22-P1-def A46-C-def using assms by simp — proved
6.3.3 Do A47 and A48 (together) support A22?
Here we have diverged from the argument network as introduced in Betz and
Cacean (2012), where A48 is rendered as an argument supporting A47. We
claim that our reconstruction is more faithful to the given natural language
description of the arguments and also better represents their intended dialecti-
cal relations. Also notice that an implicit premise is needed to reconstruct this
support relation as logically valid, namely that if every CE action is wrong,
then deployment of CE is wrong.
Let us recall the definitions: A47-C ≡ ∀ I . CEAction(I )→ Irreversible(I )
and A48-C ≡ ∀ I . Irreversible(I ) → WrongAction(I ).
lemma supports2 [`A47-C ] [`A48-C ] A22-P1 nitpick oops — countermodel
theorem assumes [`∀ I . CEAction(I ) → WrongAction(I )]−→ CEisWrong
— implicit premise
shows supports2 [`A47-C ] [`A48-C ] A22-P1
unfolding A22-P1-def A47-C-def A48-C-def using assms by simp
6.3.4 Does A49 support A22?
Observe that in this example we reuse the previous implicit premise. Let us
recall the definition: A49-C ≡ ∀ I . CEAction(I ) → WrongAction(I ).
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lemma supports1 [`A49-C ] A22-P1 nitpick oops — countermodel found
theorem assumes [`∀ I . CEAction(I ) → WrongAction(I )]−→CEisWrong
— implicit premise
shows supports1 [`A49-C ] A22-P1
unfolding A22-P1-def A49-C-def using assms by simp — proved by simpl.
6.3.5 Does A50 attack both A48 and A49?
In this example, the indirect attack towards the main thesis (conclusion of A22)
persists, since A47 and A48 jointly support A22 (see above).29 Also notice that
we employ an additional, implicit premise to reconstruct the attack relation,
namely that mitigation of climate change is not a wrong action.
Let us recall again the corresponding definitions:
A50-C ≡ Irreversible(Mitigation) ∧ USideEffects(Mitigation),
A48-C ≡ ∀ I . Irreversible(I ) → WrongAction(I ),
A49-P2 ≡ ∀ I . USideEffects(I ) → WrongAction(I ).
lemma attacks1 [`A50-C ] [`A48-C ] nitpick oops — countermodel found
lemma attacks1 [`A50-C ] [`A49-P2 ] nitpick oops — countermodel found
theorem assumes [` ¬WrongAction(Mitigation)] — implicit premise
shows attacks1 [`A50-C ] [`A48-C ]
unfolding A48-C-def A50-C-def using assms by blast — proved
theorem assumes [` ¬WrongAction(Mitigation)] — implicit premise
shows attacks1 [`A50-C ] [`A49-P2 ]
unfolding A49-P2-def A50-C-def using assms by blast — proved
6.3.6 Does A51 attack A49?
Notice that the previous additional premise is again required to reconstruct the
attack relation as deductively valid. Let us recall the definitions: A49-P2 ≡
∀ I . USideEffects(I ) → WrongAction(I ) and A51-C ≡ ∀ I .USideEffects(I ).
lemma attacks1 [`A51-C ] [`A49-P2 ] nitpick oops — countermodel found
theorem assumes [` ¬WrongAction(Mitigation)] — implicit premise
shows attacks1 [`A51-C ] [`A49-P2 ]
unfolding A49-P2-def A51-C-def using assms by blast — proved
29 Here, again, we diverge from Betz and Cacean (2012) original argument network. We
argue that, given the natural language description of the arguments, an attack relation be-
tween A50 and A48 is better motivated than between A50 and A47 (as originally presented).
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7 Challenges and Prospects
The contributions of this article are manifold. Most relevant in our opinion is
that we have laid the conceptual foundations for the integration of ideas and
techniques from abstract argumentation theory and universal meta-logical rea-
soning towards the realization of our conception of a computational hermeneu-
tics within a uniform meta-logical environment, thereby creating a momentum
of mutual fertilization. Moreover, we have depicted the added value of the inte-
grated system by analyzing and discussing example arguments and argument
networks in climate engineering, thereby illustrating how our technology can
possibly support the systematic, interactive and partly automated analysis of
contemporary discourse in a topical area.
As a further contribution, this article has introduced a conceptual frame-
work, together with several illustrative examples, enabling an improved charac-
terization and theoretical analysis of the shallow semantical embeddings (SSE)
technique. We expect that this framework will support, in particular, the de-
velopment of more elegant faithfulness proofs for SSEs of logics and logic
combinations; while these proofs have been very technical and verbose so far,
they would now be carried out concisely in few lines only. This is ongoing
work which clearly represents an important step towards a systematic method
for encoding logics (e.g., modal, deontic, epistemic, paraconsistent) in higher-
order logic, a pillar stone of the LogiKEy framework and methodology for
designing normative theories in ethical and legal reasoning (Benzmu¨ller et al.
2020). Finally, we have contributed a practical demonstration of the maturity
of modern theorem proving technology, in particular, the Isabelle/HOL proof
assistant with its integrated reasoning tools, to support ambitious further work
towards a computational hermeneutics.
As regards formal argumentation, some preliminary experiments have shown
that the expressivity of higher-order logic indeed allows us to mechanize rea-
soning with Dung’s notions of complete, grounded, preferred and stable se-
mantics in Isabelle/HOL and to use its integrated automated tools to carry
out computations. This can be very useful for prototyping tasks and as well
for reasoning with arguments at the abstract and structural level in an inte-
grated fashion. Further work is necessary to obtain a satisfactorily usable and
scalable implementation.
Concerning the prospects for a fully automated argument reconstruction
process, it is worth mentioning that the initial step from natural language to
formal representations lies outside our proposed framework. For example, in
the presented case study we have ‘outsourced’ the argumentation-mining task
to the researchers who carried out the original analysis, while the semantic-
parsing task was carried out ‘manually’ by us. However, we are much im-
pressed by recent progress in natural language processing (NLP) for these
applications and follow with great interest the latest developments in the ar-
gumentation mining community. Another important challenge concerns the
problem of coming up with candidates for additional (implicit) premises that
render an inference valid, which is an instance of the old problem of abduc-
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tion. The evaluation of candidate formulas is indeed supported by our tool-set,
e.g. model finders can determine (in)consistency automatically, and theorem
provers and so-called “hammers” help us verify validity using minimal sets of
assumptions (also useful to identify ‘question-begging’ ones). The creative part
of coming up with (plausible) candidates is, however, still a task for humans in
our approach. Abductive reasoning techniques for the kind of expressive logics
we work with (e.g. intensional, first- and higher-order) remain, to the best of
our knowledge, very limited, so as to support full automation. We could reuse
techniques and tools for some less expressive fragments of higher-order logic
(in cases where formalized arguments are bound to remain inside those frag-
ments); but in general we strive for the finest granularity level in the semantic
analysis, e.g. along the lines of Montague semantics. With all its pros and cons,
this is the distinguishing aspect of our approach.
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